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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Lonnie Johnson was convicted by a jury of grand theft by possession of stolen
property. The value used for the determination of the grade of the offense was the
purported replacement value for brand new copper wires.

The State presented no

evidence that the market value for the wires actually taken could not be satisfactorily
ascertained, nor did the State present evidence that the replacement cost proffered was
of a similar quality, design and value of the wire alleged to have been stolen -wire that
was possibly over one hundred years old. The district court entered a restitution order
upon Mr. Johnson's conviction for $2,000, or the approximate value of the replacement
cost for new wires as testified to by one of the State's witnesses at trial.
Mr. Johnson timely appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence and
asserts: (1) that there is insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict in this case;
(2) that the jury was improperly instructed, and that the district court's jury instructions
relieved the State of its burden of proof as to some of the material elements of the
offense, thereby resulting in fundamental error; (3) that the district court erred, and
violated

Mr. Johnson's constitutional rights to compulsory process and to present an

adequate defense, when the court completely excluded one of the defense witnesses
as a sanction for a discovery violation; (4) that the prosecutor committed misconduct
that rose to the level of a fundamental error; (5) that the district court erred when it
awarded restitution in the amount of $2,000; and (6) under the cumulative error
doctrine, the multitude of errors in this case require reversal of Mr. Johnson's conviction.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Officer Dan Milovanovic, an officer with the Union Pacific Railroad, received a
call that some signal wires used by the railroad appeared to have been stolen.
(Tr., p.119, Ls.3-9; p.124, Ls.1-4.) When he arrived at the location, near Dietrich, Idaho,
he could see that some of the wires were cut and hanging down from the poles to which
they were attached. (Tr., p.124, Ls.9-20.) Officer Milovanovic also saw a pile of cut
train signal wires on the ground that were readily observable because of the bright
green patina on the wire. (Tr., p.124, Ls.16-20.)
Next to the pile of wires was a tee shirt that had the initials "L.J." printed inside of
the collar. (Tr., p.124, L.21 - p.125, L.1.) As the officer continued to look around the
area, he also found a plastic bag that contained garbage. (Tr., p.125, Ls.8-15.) In
addition to the garbage, however, the bag also contained two receipts from Pacific Steel
and Recycling for the sale of copper. (Tr., p.125, Ls.16-20.) Lonnie Johnson's name
was on these receipts. (Tr., p.125, Ls.16-20.)
After collecting several items from the scene, Officer Milovanovic then went to
Pacific Steel and Recycling to conduct further investigation. (Tr., p.139, L.25 - p.140,
L.3.) He was able to identify what appeared to be signal wire used by Union Pacific in
one of the bins for scrap metal. (Tr., p.142, Ls.2-10.) An employee at the recycling
center also gave Officer Milovanovic a copy of receipts from sales that Mr. Johnson had
previously made at the center. (Tr, p.142, L . l l

- p.143, L.4.)

According to Officer

Milovanovic's testimony at trial, he was able to identify the signal wire from Union
Pacific due to its gauge and because the wire was aged and covered in "old fiber tar
insulation." (Tr., p.144, L.2 - p.147, L.17.)

After Officer Milovanovic completed his investigation at Pacific Steel and
Recycling, he participated in Mr. Johnson's arrest. (Tr., p.152, L.10

- p.153, L.lO.)

At

the time of his arrest, Mr. Johnson was driving a van that contained other wire alleged to
belong to Union Pacific. (Tr., p.153, Ls.3-10.) Mr. Johnson was originally charged with
grand theft by disposal of stolen property. (R., pp.32-33.) Subsequently, this charge
was amended to grand theft by possession of stolen property. (R., pp.41-42.)
Prior to trial, Mr. Johnson challenged the sufficiency the evidence presented at
the preliminary hearing to sustain this charge. (R., p.39.) Specifically, Mr. Johnson
asserted that:

the testimony at the preliminary hearing failed to establish that the

market value of the copper wire was over $1,000; the State improperly relied on
testimony regarding replacement value of the copper wire in contravention of I.C.

3 18-

2402(a); the proper market value of the wire was $665.05 - the price that was paid for
the raw materials of the wire by the recycling center; and that, in the event that this
amount was not deemed to be the proper market value, the default value of the wire
should be deemed to be under $1,000 pursuant to I.C. § 18-2402(c). (R., pp.55-61.)
The district court denied Mr. Johnson's motion challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence presented by the State at the preliminary hearing. (R., pp.80-90.) In doing so,
the district court held that the price paid by the recycling company for the wire was a
"salvage price," and that this price "typically" is not the same as market price. (R., p.87.)
The district court provided no analysis or legal authority for this conclusion. After
making this conclusion, the district court proceeded to hold that there was sufficient
evidence "that would legally permit the Magistrate to conclude that the market value of
the wire could not be satisfactorily ascertained and that the replacement value is a

reasonably close approximation of the design and quality of the destroyed item."

(R., pp.87-88.) The district court then stated that the differences between the old wire
that was allegedly stolen and the new, replacement wire were not substantial enough to
preclude the use of the alleged replacement cost because "[i]t is only where there is
'little or no relationship' to the quality and value of the destroyed property that a factfinder should not be allowed to consider replacement cost." (R., p.88.) Because both
wires were made from copper, the district court concluded that the wires were
sufficiently similar. (R., pp.88-89.)
At trial, Officer Milovanovic testified as to the circumstances that caused him to
arrest Mr. Johnson for grand theft. (Tr., p.119, L.3 - p.163, L.16.) However, he also
conceded that there was no direct evidence that Mr. Johnson had actually taken the
wire from the signal poles, rather than merely finding the wire by the road. (Tr., p.164,
L.10 - p.166, L.25.) The officer acknowledged that some of the wire that was taken was
no longer being actively used by the railroad and had potentially been hanging from the
poles for up to one hundred years. (Tr., p. 172, L.16 - p. 173, L. 18.)
In addition to his testimony regarding the circumstances leading to Mr. Johnson's
charges in this case, Officer Milovanovic also testified about some of Mr. Johnson's
statements that were made in connection with charges he faced in Lincoln County.
(Tr., p.156, L.23

- p.162, L.15.)

Apparently, after talking with officers about some wire

that was in his truck at the time of his arrest, Mr. Johnson made a vague statement that
he "knew it was wrong," when he took the wire that was in his van on that day.
(Tr., p.162, Ls.13-15.) The wire in question was not the subject of his charges at trial.
(Tr., p.159, L.18 - p.160, L.21.) The district court had earlier ruled that evidence of the

surrounding circumstances of the other charge out of Lincoln County could be
introduced at trial in order to support an inference that Mr. Johnson had knowledge that
the wire that was the subject of the charges was stolen. (Tr., p.60, L.20 - p.67, L.23.)
The State also presented the testimony of an employee of Pacific Steel and
Recycling, Russ Taylor. (Tr., p.175, Ls.14-18.) He testified that the recycling center
took additional steps, mainly requiring a copy of the person's driver's license, when they
engaged in transactions involving the sale of aluminum and copper because those
items are sometimes stolen prior to being brought in for sale. (Tr., p.176, L.7 - p.177,
L.18.) The recycling center also generates receipts showing the weight and type of
metal, what was paid for it, and who brought the metal in for sale. (Tr., p.178, L.20 p.179, L.17.) Mr. Taylor further testified that the copper processed for resale at their
facility usually sold for between $3.10 and $3.25 per pound to the companies that
bought copper from the recycling center. (Tr., p.189, Ls.1-10.) Another employee of
the recycling center who processed the wire that Mr. Johnson brought in testified that
Mr. Johnson represented that he acquired the wire from his brother when he passed
away. (Tr., p.201, L.7 - p.203, L.2.)
Douglas Richard, an employee of Union Pacific Railroad, provided testimony
regarding the costs to replace the missing wire with new wire. (Tr., p.219, L.21 - p.231,
L.4.) According to Mr. Richard's calculations, the equivalent cost - based on the same
amount of pounds of new wire as was allegedly sold by Mr. Johnson to Pacific Steel
and Recycling -was approximately $2,000. (Tr., p.228, L.25 - p.231, L.4.) There was
nothing in Mr. Richard's calculations that provided for the depreciation in value of the
old wire that was actually taken and that could have been as much as I 0 0 years old.

(Tr., p.228, L.25 - p.231, L.4.) Mr. Richards did acknowledge the difference in quality
between the replacement wire and that which was allegedly stolen; and he further
admitted that he did not know the difference in value between the wire as taken and the
wire that could be purchased to replace it. (Tr., p.234, L.7 - p.235, L.25.)
At the close of the State's evidence, Mr. Johnson moved the district court,
pursuant to I.C.R. 29, for a judgment of acquittal. (Tr., p.240, Ls.11-16.) In support of
this motion, Mr. Johnson argued to the district court that the State's evidence in the form
of the receipts showing what Mr. Johnson was paid for the wire established the market
value of the copper wire. (Tr., p.241, L.23 - p.242, L.4.) Defense counsel asserted that
Mr. Taylor's testimony regarding the amounts that the recycling center was paid by
other purchasers for the copper would also establish a market value for the wire.
(Tr., p.242, Ls.8-17) Given that the highest valuation for the resale of copper by the
recycling center during the relevant time period was $3.25 per pound, this would make
the market value for the copper, at most, $919.75. (Tr., p.242, Ls.8-17.) As such, the
evidence showed that the market value of the wire was less than $1,000, and
Mr. Johnson could only be guilty of petit theft. (Tr., p.242, Ls.8-17.)
In addition, Mr. Johnson asserted that the value presented by the State - the
replacement cost measured by the cost of brand new wires that had to be purchased in
volume

- was an inappropriate measure because it was not an approximation of the

quality and value of the wire that was actually taken. (Tr., p.242, L.18 - p.243, L.17.)
Given this, Mr. Johnson asserted that this replacement cost should not be used as the
measure for the degree of his offense. Finally, Mr. Johnson asserted that the State

failed to produce evidence that Mr. Johnson actually knew that the wire was stolen.
(Tr., p.244, Ls.16-23.)
At the same time, Mr. Johnson also informed the district court that a defense
witness, James Arterburn, who had been missing and whom defense counsel had been
unable to locate, had contacted defense counsel earlier that day. (Tr., p.240, L.16

-

p.241, L.3.) Mr. Johnson informed the court that Mr. Arterburn could testify that there
were rolls of copper wire located behind Mr. Johnson's brother's house, which would
corroborate Mr. Johnson's version of events regarding how he came to sell copper wire
to Pacific Steel and Recycling. (Tr., p.241, Ls.4-9.) He could also testify as to the
circumstances under which Mr. Johnson made one sale of copper wire under
Mr. Arturburn's brother's name. (See State's Exhibit 9.)
With regard to Mr. Johnson's motion for a judgment of acquittal, the State
asserted that there was no market value for the copper wire that was allegedly stolen
because the recycling company did not sell the wire in the same form as it received the
wire. (Tr., p.246, Ld.4-14.) The State's sole argument with regard to the replacement
value offered at trial was that this purported cost was measured close in time to the
alleged timeframe that the property was taken. (Tr., p.246, L.15

- p.247, L.1.)

The

State made no argument that the replacement wire was similar in type or quality to the
wire that was alleged to have been stolen. (Tr., p.246, L.15

- p.247,

L.1.) As to

Mr. Johnson's knowledge, the State relied on the fact that Mr. Johnson's tee shirt and
the bag containing the receipts from the recycling center were in such proximity to the
area where the wire was taken as to support an inference of knowledge. (Tr., p.247,
Ls.2-11.)

The State further argued that Mr. Johnson had brought in wire that was

identified as wire belonging to the railroad based upon characteristics of gauge and
oxidation. (Tr., p.247, L.12 - p.248, L.3.)
In response, Mr. Johnson pointed out that the amount that the Pacific Steel and
Recycling Center paid for the wire was, itself, the market value. (Tr., p.248, Ls.5-I 1.)
He also noted that simply because there was a very specific market for the copper wire
did not lessen the fact that there was, in fact, a market. (Tr., p.248, Ls.5-24.)
The district court concluded that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury
could find that Mr. Johnson had taken the wire that was alleged to have been stolen.
(Tr., p.249, L.23

- p.251, L.8.)

Regarding the valuation issue, the district court found

that the salvage value of the wire was approximately $665. (Tr., p.251, Ls.9-11.) The
court further found that the "resell salvage value" of the copper wire was approximately
$919. (Tr., p.251, Ls.11-12.) Finally, the district court noted that the third proposed
valuation was the estimate of replacement cost that was nearly $2,000. (Tr., p.251,
Ls.23-24.) However, the district court ultimately found valuation to be an issue for the
jury that was, in the court's view and without further explanation, somehow contingent
on whether the jury believed that the wire taken was active signal wire or was instead
inactive wire. (Tr., p.251, L.24 - p.252, L.8.)
When defense counsel asked for the opportunity to clarify the district court's
ruling, the court denied her request, stating, "No. You made your argument, let me
finish my comments." (Tr., p.252, Ls.9-11.)
After the district court's ruling denying the defense motion for a judgment of
acquittal, the court then returned to the issue of whether Mr. Arterburn would be
permitted to testify for the defense. (Tr., p.252, Ls.24-25.) Defense counsel clarified

that she had been aware of this witness, but had been unable to locate him as
apparently Mr. Aterburn's phone had been disconnected. (Tr., p.253, Ls.5-8, 22-25.)
While defense counsel had attempted to contact Mr. Aterburn through other people, it
further appears that counsel's efforts were not availing until the morning of
Mr. Johnson's request to present Mr. Arterburn's testimony after defense counsel was
approached by Mr. Arterburn in the hallway of the courthouse. (Tr., p.253, L.22 - p.254,
L.7.)
Defense counsel iterated for the district court the importance of Mr. Arterburn's
testimony to the defense case. (Tr., p.254, L.7

- p.255,

L.2.) Mr. Arterburn could

corroborate Mr. Johnson's prior representations to the employees at the recycling
center that the wire came from his deceased brother's property, rather than being from
any of the signal poles owned by the Union Pacific Railroad. (Tr., p.241, Ls.4-9, p.254,
Ls.7-9.)

Mr. Arterburn had apparently seen the spools of copper wire behind

Mr. Johnson's brother's house. (Tr., p.241, Ls.4-5.) Additionally, Mr. Arterburn and
Randy Arterburn, his brother, had given Mr. Johnson permission to use their existing
account at the recycling center to process one of his sales of copper wire. (Tr., p.241,
Ls.6-9.) This was the reason that Randy Aterburn's name appeared on one of the
receipts for the recycling center.

(State's Exhibit 9.)

In light of the fact that

Mr. Arterburn had no apparent motivation to make up a story, defense counsel argued
that the importance to Mr. Johnson's defense of Mr. Arterburn's corroboration was
enormous. (Tr., p.255, Ls.10-23.)
The State objected to the presentation of this witness due to a lack of notice.
Specifically, the prosecutor argued that she was never told by the defense that they

were still searching for a potential witness nor informed of Mr. Arterburn at all.
(Tr., p.253, Ls.11-17.) Additionally, the State mentioned that the notice was extremely
late and, "the state has already rested." (Tr., p.253, Ls.18-19.)
Because the State had requested discovery under I.C.R. 16, and because the
defense admittedly did not provide Mr. Arterburn's name as a potential witness, the
district court found that the disclosure was "way beyond late." (Tr., p.255, Ls.12-19.)
The district court further found that defense counsel's inability to locate Mr. Arterburn as
a witness did not excuse the obligation to also disclose him to the State. (Tr., p.256,
Ls.5-12.)

But rather than balance the potential prejudice to Mr. Johnson's ability to

present a defense against the potential prejudice to the State, or consider lesser
remedies, the district court denied Mr. Johnson's request to present Mr. Arterburn's
testimony and concluded:
It is the court's discretion to impose sanctions with regard to discovery
violations. The pretrial order in this case required disclosure of witnesses
to be completed long ago. I'm not going to permit Mr. Arterburn to testify
in this case.
(Tr., p.256, Ls.13-17.)
Mr. Johnson testified on his own behalf at trial. (Tr., p.258, Ls.10-22.) In addition
to other seasonal work, Mr. Johnson was a "scrapper" of various metals. (Tr., p.260,
Ls.15-23.) This usually involved him taking trips to refuse dumps to look for the raw
materials to be recycled - generally found in items such as bent pipes, old radiators,
and scrap wires. (Tr., p.260, L.15

- p.261,

L.12.) He would then do some minimal

processing of these materials so as to prepare them to be sold to the recycling center.
(Tr., p.13, Ls.13-24.) Mr. Johnson would often cut the pieces of metal into smaller

pieces because that made them easier to transport and because the recycling center
preferred him to do so. (Tr., p.261, Ls.13-24.)
Mr. Johnson informed the jury that his brother had recently passed away in a
motorcycle collision, which left Mr. Johnson in the position of having to take care of his
brother's estate. (Tr., p.259, L.13

- p.260,

L.4.) While taking a look at his brother's

property, Mr. Johnson discovered some rolls of old, oxidized copper wire in the weeds
next to a shop. (Tr., p.262, Ls.8-25.) He testified that there was nothing in particular
about this wire that led him to believe that it was stolen.

(Tr., p.263, Ls.1-3.)

Mr. Johnson gathered up the wire, took it to where he was staying, and cut it into pieces
so that he could fit it into his backpack and sell it to the recycling center. (Tr., p.263,
Ls.7-15, p.264, Ls.3-7.) He took two different loads of copper wire from his brother's
property in to Pacific Steel and Recycling to be sold. (Tr., p.263, Ls.10-24.)
On another occasion, Mr. Johnson was driving nearby to some railroad tracks
when some wire became entangled in the undercarriage of his van. (Tr., p.264, L.14 p.266, L.24.) After hearing the wire dragging underneath his van, Mr. Johnson stopped
the van, got out, and saw that the wire beneath his van was copper. (Tr., p.266, Ls.819.) It looked like the wire had been abandoned, so Mr. Johnson decided that he would
cut the length of wire into smaller pieces and transport it in his van. (Tr., p.266, Ls.2124.)

According to Mr. Johnson, the bag containing garbage, his tee shirt, and the

receipts must have fallen out of his van at this time and been blown closer to the train
tracks. (Tr., p.267, Ls.16-23.)
After the defense rested, the district court, outside of the presence of the jury,
asked both Mr. Johnson and the State whether they had any objections or additions to

the proposed jury instructions.
(Tr., p.302, L.2

- p.303, L.lO.)

(Tr., p.302, L.2

-

p.303, L.lO.)

Neither party did.

The district court provided a jury instruction indicating

that "value," for purposes of determining whether the grand theft charge was
established, was determined by:
The market value of the property at the time and place of the crime, or if
the market value cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of
replacement of the property within a reasonable time after the crime.
When the value of the property cannot be satisfactorily ascertained
pursuant to any of the above standards, its value shall be deemed to be
$1,000 or less.
(Tr., p.310, L.18-p.311, L.1.)
The district court noted that the State bore the burden of establishing beyond a
reasonable doubt that the alleged theft was a grand theft - that the value of the property
alleged to have been taken was over $1,000. (Tr., p.309, L.17-21.) But the district
court also instructed the jury that the State's burden of proof only extended to material
elements of the offense as set forth in the court's instruction. (Tr., p.307, Ls.16-22.)
And the district court never instructed the jury as to the legal definition of "market value,"
that the State bore the burden of establishing that market value could not be
satisfactorily ascertained before they could consider any purported replacement costs,
nor did the court instruct the jury that the State had to establish the similarity in quality,
design, and value between the alleged property taken and the proffered replacement
cost in order for the replacement cost to be the proper measure of the grade of the
offense. (Tr., p.304, L.8 - p.314, L.23.)
In addition, the district court provided the following, non-pattern jury instruction:
The instructions on reasonable doubt and the burden of proof to be carried
by the State of Idaho do not require the State to prove every fact and

every circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden of proof
extends only to the material elements of the offense. These material
elements are set forth in the following instruction.
(Tr., p.307, Ls.16-22; R., p.167.)
The district court then provided an instruction outlining the elements of theft by
possession of stolen property. (Tr., p.307, L.23

- p.309, L.2; R., p.168.)

During closing arguments, the prosecutor asserted that, "... the defendant and
[Officer Milovanovic] both I.D. the third batch that came in as Union Pacific Railroad wire
because that was a different color than the wire the defendant brought in with the green
tint." (Tr., p.318, Ls.16-20.) In actuality, Mr. Johnson had never conceded or identified
any of the wire that he had brought in for sale at the recycling center as being from the
Union Pacific Railroad. (Tr., p.258, L.10 - p.300, L.7.) In fact, Mr. Johnson had actually
testified that there was nothing in any of the wire that he had found and sold that
indicated anyone's ownership, and specifically nothing that would indicate to him that
the wire belonged to Union Pacific. (Tr., p.299, L.23 - p.300, L.7.)
In addition, the prosecutor specifically highlighted those aspects of Mr. Johnson's
testimony that would have been supported by the testimony of Mr. Aterburn had the
district court not excluded him as a witness; and, in doing so, challenged the credibility
of Mr. Johnson's version of events. (Tr,. p.322, L.3

- p.324, L.6.)

Despite having been

informed a few hours earlier that Mr. Aterburn could provide testimony regarding why
Mr. Johnson was using Mr. Aterburn's brother's account with the recycling company,
which would clarify why one of the receipts reflected Randy Aterburn's name as the
person on the account, the prosecutor argued to the jury (who were completely unaware
of this witness) that the presence of Randy Aterburn's name on the receipt was part of

an attempt by Mr. Johnson to mislead the recycling company. (Tr., p.322, L.3 - p.323,
L.6.)

During closing arguments, the prosecutor also attempted to cast doubt on

Mr. Johnson's testimony that his brother had died, which was another fact that could
have been verified by Mr. Aterburn. (Tr., p.323, L.14 - p.324, L.6.)
Finally, the prosecutor made the following statement to the jury:
On a new note, ladies and gentlemen, the railroad is a long celebrated
industry, but it is definitely in decline. There is a lot of competition out
there these days. There is [sic] semis, boats, planes, and most of all
technology, but that doesn't make it okay for thieves to be targeting
railroad property. Railroad lines are not for scavengers and that is what
the defendant is. He is a scavenger. He is a buzzard. His is picking off
the bones of the railroad industry.
(Tr., p.330, L.25 - 331, L.8.)
The jury convicted Mr. Johnson of grand theft by possession of stolen property,
and further found him guilty of the persistent violator sentencing enhancement.
(Tr., p.386, Ls.17-18, p.399, Ls.9-17, R., pp.178, 180.) Upon being convicted of grand
theft, Mr. Johnson filed another I.C.R. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. (R., pp.190200.) In this motion,

Mr. Johnson alleged that there was insufficient proof to establish

that, at the time he acquired it, the wire was stolen rather than abandoned by the
railroad; that Mr. Johnson knew that the wire was actually stolen; that the value of the
copper wire exceeded $1,000; and that the replacement value provided for the wire was
an accurate measure given the differences between the wire taken and the replacement
wire. (R., pp.190-200.)
At the hearing on this motion, Mr. Johnson pointed out directly that the State
failed to prove that the market value could not be satisfactorily ascertained, and that the
State presented no testimony or evidence whatsoever regarding the issue of market

value, but instead relied exclusively on evidence of the replacement cost of the wire.
(Tr., p.411, L.20

- p.412, L.4.)

As noted by Mr. Johnson, the State, "declared that the

two values that were presented by the defense were simply salvage value, skipped right
over market value and went to replacement cost without attempting to show that we
couldn't determine what the market value was." (Tr., p.411, L.25 - p.412, L.4.)
In response, the State noted that these same arguments were made in support of
Mr. Johnson's earlier motion for a judgment of acquittal, which was denied, and that the
inferences from the evidence supported the jury's verdict. (Tr., p.416, L.12

- p.419,

L.16.)
The district court denied Mr. Johnson's motion.

( T . p.434, Ls.13-20.)

Regarding the issue of sufficiency of the evidence that the property was abandoned, the
district court noted that the jury's finding that Mr. Johnson was guilty of a theft would be
directly contrary to a finding that the wires at issue were abandoned, and that there was
evidence to support this finding. (Tr., p.426, L.20 - p.429, L.25.) The district court
noted that the jury's verdict reflected an adverse credibility determination against

Mr. Johnson given that they rejected his testimony about where he had found the wire.
(Tr., p.430, Ls.1-16.)
As to Mr. Johnson's contentions regarding the issue of the valuation of the wire,
the district court acknowledged that this was a close issue. (Tr., p.430, Ls.17-18.)
Notably, the district court stated, "It's always been a troubling point in this case as to
whether the wire that was taken down was an active line or an inactive line. I think the
assumption being made is if it's an inactive line then it's worthless.

I don't think

anybody testified to that." (Tr., p.431, Ls.16-20.) However, because the segments of

the wire could not have been practicably spliced together to serve the purpose to which
the railroad was using them, the district court determined that it was proper to use as
the measure or value of the replacement costs. (Tr., p.433, Ls.4-17.)
During the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor originally requested an additional
30 days in order to consult with Union Pacific Railroad regarding restitution because she
was "not exactly sure" of the amount of restitution that would be requested. (Tr., p.444,
Ls.15-19.) Defense counsel asked for a hearing on the issue of restitution and agreed
that the 30 days requested by the prosecution would be a reasonable amount of time in
order to prepare. (Tr., p.445, Ls.2-6.) Despite the mutual request for 30 days, and the
lack of any specific figure from the State as to the basis for restitution, the district court
ordered restitution in the amount of $2,000 even. (Tr., p.448, Ls.14-17.) The district
court then denied Mr. Johnson's request for a restitution hearing. (Tr., p.448, Ls.20-24.)
Mr. Johnson asked the court to reconsider in light of the evidentiary issues at play.
(Tr., p.449, Ls.3-10.)
The district court granted the motion, provided that Mr. Johnson submitted notice
seeking the restitution hearing. (Tr., p.449, Ls.11-13.) The State then shifted its earlier
posture and asserted that there was no reason why the restitution issue could not be
decided at the sentencing hearing based upon the testimony given at trial. (Tr., p.455,
Ls.16-21.) Mr. Johnson asked that he be allowed to cross-examine the State's witness
who testified as to the replacement cost of the wire because it was still an open
question as to whether the railroad ever intended to actually replace the full amount of
wire

- including the inactive wire - that was alleged to have been taken.

L.23 - p.457, L.8.) The district court then reversed itself and concluded:

(Tr., p.455,

I'm going to reverse myself from what I said earlier. Frankly, I've heard
the restitution argument in this case already about three times now. What
I'm ruling in my discretion, which restitution is a discretionary function, is a
$2,000 restitution.
,

(Tr., p.457, Ls.15-19.)
The district court sentenced Mr. Johnson to 14 years, with five years fixed, for his
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conviction of grand theft. (Tr., p.454, Ls.8-13; R., pp.205-208.) Mr. Johnson timely
appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence. (R., pp.205, 210.)
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ISSUES
1.

Was there insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict of guilt on the charge
of grand theft?

2.

Did the district court err in failing to properly instruct the jury that the State bore
the burden of proof to establish that the market value was not ascertainable; in
failing to instruct the jury that, in order to use replacement value, the State first
had to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the replacement cost offered by
the State was for property that was similar in quality, design, and value as that
alleged to have been stolen; and further err in instructing the jury that the State
did not have the burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, facts other than
those outlined by the district court?

3.

Did the district court err, and violate Mr. Johnson's constitutional right to present
an adequate defense and to compulsory process, when the court excluded an
exculpatory defense witness as a discovery sanction?

4.

Did the prosecutor commit misconduct rising to the level of a fundamental error
when she referred to Mr. Johnson as a "scavenger" and a "buzzard;" and when
she mischaracterized the substance of Mr. Johnson's testimony during closing
arguments?

5.

Did the district court err when the court awarded restitution in the amount of
$2,000?

6.

Does proper application of the cumulative error doctrine require reversal in this
case?

ARGUMENT

1.
There Was Insufficient Evidence To Supoort The Juw's Verdict Of Guilt On The Charqe
Of Grand Theft
A.

Introduction
In this case, the fact of the value of the wire was the determinative fact of

whether Mr. Johnson was guilty of a misdemeanor, with a maximum statutory
punishment of one year, or of a felony, with a maximum statutory punishment of 14
years. However, there were two other predicate factual findings that the jury had to
make before it could reach the conclusion that Mr. Johnson was guilty of a felony. The
only purported value that could elevate Mr. Johnson's offense to a felony was the
replacement value as set forth by Mr. Richard's testimony. But, in order to apply the
replacement value, the jury had to first find that the market value for the property could
not be satisfactorily ascertained and then also find that the replacement cost submitted
by the State was for property of like quality and value as that of the property taken.
Because there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of either of these facts,
there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict on the charge of grand theft.
B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review upon a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to

support a conviction is whether the jury's verdict is supported by substantial, competent
evidence. See, e.g., Sfafe v. Vandenacre, 131 Idaho 507, 510, 960 P.2d 190, 193
(Ct. App. 1998). This Court will not overturn a conviction based upon insufficiency of
the evidence where a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt, nor will this Court substitute its own view of the
evidence for that of the jury. Id. All evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the
State. Id. Further, matters regarding credibility of the witnesses, the weight of the
testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom are solely within the
province of the jury. Id. "A judgment must be reversed, however, if the evidence is
insufficient to support the conviction." State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho 698, 701, 946 P.2d
1338,1341 (Ct. App. 1997).
Where, as here, a defendant elects to introduce evidence rather than to rely
solely on a I.C.R. 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal, the defendant waives the right
to limit this Court's review on appeal to the sufficiency of the evidence at the close of the
State's evidence. Id. Rather, this Court reviews all of the evidence, including that
offered by the defense, in determining whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain
the conviction. Id.
C.

There Was Insufficient Evidence To Support A Findina, Bevond A Reasonable
Doubt, That Market Value Was Not Ascertainable Because The State's Own
Evidence Established The Market Value Of The Copper Wire Alleaed To Have
Been Stolen And Because The State Presented No Evidence That Market Value
Could Not Reasonably Be Ascertained
Under Idaho's statutory scheme for the grading of theft offenses, a theft

constitutes a grand theft

- as opposed to a misdemeanor petit theft - only if the State

can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the value of the property taken exceeded
$1,000. I.C. §§ 18-2403(4); 18-2407(b)(I). The maximum sentence for grand theft is

14 years incarceration, while the statutory maximum sentence for petit theft is only one
year. I.C. 5 18-2408. "Value" is defined, under I.C. § 18-2402, as:

... the market value of the property at the time and place of the crime, or if
such cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of replacement of the
property within a reasonable time after the crime.
I.C.

3 18-2402(1l)(a).
Apparent in this statutory scheme is that the grade of the theft offense depends

on the value of the property alleged to have been stolen. The ldaho Court of Appeals
has addressed the meaning of "market value" as that term is used in I.C. § 18-2402(11).
See State V. Smith, 144 ldaho 687, 693, 169 P.3d 275,281 (Ct. App. 2007). The court
clarified that market value is defined as, "the reasonable price at which the owner would
hold those goods out for sale to the general public." Id. Alternatively, "fair market
value" can also be defined as "the price that a seller is willing to accept and a buyer is
willing to pay on the open market and in an arm's-length transaction." BLACK'SLAW
DICTIONARY,
1587 (8thed. 2004).
Under the Sixth Amendment, any fact, other than a prior criminal conviction,
which increases the maximum range of punishment that a defendant may receive for a
criminal offense must be submitted to the jury and proved by the State beyond a
reasonable doubt. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004); Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,490 (2000); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684,697-703 (1975). In
light of these constitutional holdings, ldaho cases have recognized that any fact that a
jury would have to find in order to increase the range of punishment faced by the
defendant must be treated as an element of the offense for purposes of pleading and
proof. See, e.g., State v. Gerardo, 147 ldaho 22, 30, 205 P.3d 671, 679 (Ct. App.
2009).

In this case, the fact of the value of the wire was the determinative fact of
whether Mr. Johnson was guilty of a misdemeanor, with a maximum statutory
punishment of one year, or of a felony, with a maximum statutory punishment of 14
years. And only the replacement cost proffered by the State could support a finding of
guilt of grand theft, rather than petit theft. However, there were two other predicate
factual findings that the jury had to make before it could reach the conclusion that
Mr. Johnson was guilty of a felony.

The only purported value that could elevate

Mr. Johnson's offense to a felony was the replacement value as set forth by
Mr. Richard's testimony. But, in order to apply the replacement value, the jury had to
first find that the market value for the property could not be satisfactorily ascertained
and that the replacement cost submitted by the State was for property of like quality and
value as that of the property taken. As such, because these two facts had to be found
before replacement value could be used to determine the grade of the offense by the
State, the State had the burden of proving these facts beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 697-703; accord State v. Martin, 23
P.3d 216, 224-225 (Mont. 2001).
This is consistent with the ldaho Court of Appeals' Opinion in State v. Hughes,
130 ldaho 698,703, 946 P.2d 1338, 1343 (Ct. App. 1997). The defendant in Hughes
was charged with malicious injury to property, which, like theft, is graded according to
the value of the property at issue in the charge. Id. at 702, 946 P.2d at 1342. The
Hughes Court first determined that, when the property at issue has been completely
destroyed, the fair market value of the property at the time and place of the property's

destruction is the proper measure of valuation. Id. at 703, 946 P.2d at 1343. While
replacement value can be used in appropriate circumstances, the court held:

... replacement cost evidence may be used as an indicator of value only
when the State has demonstrated that the fair market value of the
destroyed item is not reasonably ascertainable or that the item has no
market value, and when replacement cost evidence is relied upon, the
State must show that the replacement (whether actually purchased by the
victim or not) is a reasonably close approximation of the design and
qualify of the destroyed item.
Id.

There was insufficient evidence in this case that market value could not be
satisfactorily ascertained. First, the State's own evidence demonstrated that there was,
in fact, a market value for the copper wires and also established the value of the wires
according to this standard. Second, even assuming that the State had not already
presented evidence establishing the market value, the State presented no evidence that
market value could not be satisfactorily ascertained.
Here, the State put into evidence receipts from the Pacific Steel and Recycling
Company that demonstrated the actual market value for the wire -the price that a seller
was willing to accept and a buyer was willing to pay for the property on the open market
in an arm's-length transaction. (State's Exhibits 9, 13, 14.) The State produced these
receipts as exhibits for the jury. (Tr., p.135, L.25 - p.136, L.2.) This market value was
only approximately $665, far short of the threshold of over $1,000 required for a
conviction of grand theft. (Tr., p.242, Ls.3-4; State's Exhibits 9, 13, 14.)
Other jurisdictions have similarly indicated that, where there is proof of the price
received by the defendant for selling wires alleged to have been stolen, this proof is
competent to establish the market value of the wire. See Greene v. State, 406 So.2d

805, 808 (Miss. 1981); State v. Oft, 763 P.2d 810, 81 1-813 (Utah Ct. App. 1988);
Loddy v. State, 502 P.2d 194, 196 (Wyo. 1972); see also Dyba v. State, 549 S.W.2d
178, 180 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
In Off, the defendant was charged with felony theft based upon the State's
allegation that he had stolen and sold copper wire.

Ott, 763 P.2d at 811-812.

In

support of its valuation of the copper wire, the State presented evidence of a sales
receipt from the salvage company that had bought the wire, testimony regarding how
much the specific wire was sold for, and testimony as to how much the salvage
company paid for that type of wire at the time of the offense. Id. As does Idaho, Utah
measures the value of property, for purposes of determining the grade of a theft
offense, by market value. Id. at 813. Also like Idaho, Utah defines "market value" as
the "measure of what the owner could expect to receive, and the amount a willing buyer
would pay to the true owner of the stolen item." Id. Based upon these parameters, the
Ott Court determined that the sale value of the wire to the salvage facility was an
appropriate measure of the market value of the wire. Id. at 812-813.
Aside from the fact that the State's own evidence established the market value
for the copper wire alleged to have been stolen, the State also presented no evidence
that the market value for copper wire could not be satisfactorily ascertained. Instead,
the State merely posited a blanket assertion that salvage value could not be used as
market value and that the change in length or shape of the the wire somehow meant
that the value of the copper comprising the wire was not a "market value." (Tr., p.326,
L.25

- p.327,

L.ll.)

It is axiomatic that the arguments of counsel are not competent

evidence. See, e.g., State v. Fondren, 24 ldaho 663, 135 P. 265, 267 (1913). Because

the State presented no actual evidence in support of a claim that market value could not
be satisfactorily ascertained, there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict
in this case.
This conclusion is consistent with the holdings of other jurisdictions with similar
statutory schemes regarding the valuation of property for purposes of determining the
grade of a theft offense. See, e.g., Sfafe v. Ohms, 46 P.3d 263, 266-267 (Mont. 2002);
Robinson v. Stafe, 686 So.2d 1370, 1373 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). As noted by the
court in Robinson:
The record does not reflect that the state made any effort of showing that
it could not "satisfactorily ascertain" the market value of the smoke
detectors removed from the walls. This step was necessary to justify the
value of the loss being ascertained by the cost of replacement of the
property. The state failed to carry its burden of proof as to the value
element under a grand theft charge.
Robinson, 686 So.2d at 1373.
The Montana Supreme Court similarly held that:

... the State failed to establish that the market value could not be
satisfactorily ascertained. Instead, the State chose to rely exclusively on
the replacement value to meet its burden of proof. The State failed to
establish the necessary predicate to the use of replacement value for
purposes of determining value under $ 45-2-101(74)(a), MCA (1997).
Accordingly, no rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of felony theft, as defined by statute, beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Ohms, 46 P.3d at 267.

D.

There Was Insufficient Evidence To Support A Conclusion Beyond A Reasonable
Doubt That The Replacement Value Put Forth Bv The State Was For Property
That Was Similar In Quality, Desiqn. And Value As That Of The Wire Alleaed To
Have Been Stolen
While ldaho appellate courts have not addressed the parameters of the use of

replacement value for purposes of determining the grade of a theft offense, this issue
has been addressed with regards to a charge of malicious injury to property where the
property at issue has been completely destroyed as opposed to merely damaged. See
Hughes, 130 ldaho at 702-704, 946 P.2d at 1342-1344. As previously noted, the
Hughes Court held that, where the State seeks to use replacement cost as the measure
of damages, the State bears the burden to show that the replacement cost proffered
bears a reasonably close relationship to the quality and value of the property at issue in
the charge. Id. In explaining this holding, the court noted:
If the State attempts to prove value through replacement cost, however,
we think it incumbent upon the State to produce some evidence that the
replacement item is of a quality and design comparable to that of the
destroyed item. This is so because a replacement actually purchased by
the crime victim may bear little or no relationship to the quality and value
of the destroyed property, and the classification of the offense as a felony
or a misdemeanor should not turn upon the victim's choice between a
higher quality, more expensive replacement and a lower quality, more
modestly priced item.

Id. As such, the State must first prove that the replacement value being proffered bears
a close relationship in quality, design, and value to the property alleged to have been
stolen in order to use replacement cost as the measure of the grade of the offense.
This is in accord with the holdings of other jurisdictions that have similarly limited
the use of replacement cost in the valuation of property for purposes of establishing the
grade of a theft offense to a value that is similar in kind to that of the property taken.

See, e.g., People v. A.G., 605 P.2d 487, 488 (Colo. App. 1979); Romero v. State, 996
P.2d 894, 896-897 (Nev. 2000.). The Nevada Supreme Court in Romero noted:

... when the replacement cost is based upon current market price for an
unused new item, such evidence alone is generally not sufficient to
establish the monetary thresholds which distinguish between
misdemeanor, gross misdemeanor, and felony property crimes. Such a
rule is mandated by the language of the statute, which separates the
various degrees of theft based upon the value of the property that was
stolen, not the cost to replace the stolen property with a brand new item.
Romero, 966 P.2d at 896-897.

Likewise, the Colorado court in A.G. reversed the

defendant's conviction for felony theft due to insufficient evidence because neither the
replacement value nor the original purchase price put forth by the State reflected the
depreciation in value due to the age of the items alleged to be stolen. A.G., 605 P.2d at

Here, the State's own evidence established that the wires alleged to have been
stolen were used in the telegraph service and could be approximately one hundred
years old. (Tr., p.173, Ls.4-10.) The State's own evidence also established that there
were significant differences in the quality and design of the wire alleged to have been
taken and the wire used to calculate replacement cost. (Tr., p.235, Ls.1-25.) The wire
alleged to have been taken was very old; oxidized and corroded; and parts of the wire
were affixed with old tape, insulation, tar, and fibers. (Tr., p.235, Ls.1-16.) In contrast,
the wire used to value replacement cost was brand new and covered with a plastic
insulated coating, presumably to guarantee a lifetime of operability and use far in
excess of that of the corroded old wires. (Tr., p.234, Ls.7-16.) Additionally, the State's
own witness testified that he was unable to determine the difference in value between

the old wire and the new wire because he was not a "scrap dealer." (Tr., p.235, Ls.1725.)
The replacement value proffered by the State in this case was, by the State's
own evidence, not for property that was similar in quality, design, and value as that
alleged to have been stolen. As such, the State did not meet its burden with regards to
the presentation of an adequate replacement cost; and therefore the jury's verdict in this
case was not supported by substantial and competent evidence.

E.

The Default Value Of Propertv In Absence Of Proof Of Market Value Or Proper
Replacement Cost Is Less Than $1,000
Under I.C. § 18-2402(11)(c), when the value of property cannot be satisfactorily

ascertained wither through the market value of the property at the time and place of the
crime, or by a proper measure of the replacement cost, "its value shall be deemed to be
one thousand dollars ($1,000) or less." I.C.

3 18-2402(1l)(c). Assuming, arguendo,

that this Court determines that the State had adduced sufficient proof to establish that
the market value of the property could not be satisfactorily ascertained, and because
the replacement cost proffered by the State was not representative of the quality and
value of the property alleged to have been stolen, the default provisions of I.C. § 182402(1 l)(c) would then apply. This renders the default value of the property at issue in
this case to be $1,000 dollars or less. As such, this Court should vacate Mr. Johnson's
conviction for grand theft, along with the persistent violator enhancement, and remand
this case for resentencing on the lesser offense of misdemeanor theft.
There was insufficient evidence in this case to support a guilty verdict on the
charge of grand theft.

Accordingly, Mr. Johnson asks that this Court vacate his

judgment of his conviction and remand his case for entry of a conviction on the lesser
offense of misdemeanor theft. See Hughes, 130 Idaho at 704,946 P.2d at 1344.

II.
The District Court Erred In Failing To Properly lnstruct The Jurv That The State Bore
The Burden Of Proof To Establish That Market Value Was Not Ascertainable And
Failing To lnstruct The Jurv That, In Order To Use Replacement Value, The State First
Had To Establish Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That The Replacement Cost Offered By
The State Was For Property That Was Similar In Quality, Design. And Value As That
Alleged To Have Been Stolen; And Further Erred In lnstructinq The Jurv That The State
Did Not Have The Burden To Prove, Beyond A Reasonable Doubt. Facts Other Than
Those Outlined By Specifically The District Court
A.

Introduction
The district court in this case failed to instruct the jury that the State bore the

burden of establishing, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the market value for the wire
alleged to have been stolen could not be reasonably ascertained before the jury could
use replacement value to measure the grade of the offense; and that the State also
bore the burden of proof to establish that the replacement cost put forth by the State
was for property that was similar in design, quality, and value as that alleged to have
been taken. This error was compounded by the district court's use of a non-pattern jury
instruction that informed the jurors that the State did not have to prove all of the facts in
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, and that district court would tell them what facts
the State did have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Taken as a whole, the district
court's instructions as given to the jury rose to the level of fundamental error that
relieved the State of its burden of proof in this case.

B.

Standard Of Review
The question of whether the jury was properly instructed is a question of law that

this Court reviews de novo. State v. Pearce, 146 ldaho 241, 247, 192 P.3d 1065, 1071
(2008); State v. Rolon, 146 ldaho 684, 693, 201 P.3d 657, 662 (Ct. App. 2008). This
Court reviews the jury instructions as a whole in order to determine whether the
instructions fully and accurately reflect applicable law. Rolon, 146 ldaho at 693, 201

The District Court Erred In Failina To Properlv lnstruct The Jurv That The State
Bore The Burden Of Proof To Establish That Market Value Was Not
Ascertainable And Failina To lnstruct The Jurv That, In Order To Use
Replacement Value, The State First Had To Establish Bevond A Reasonable
Doubt That The Replacement Cost Offered By The State Was For Property That
Was Similar In Quality, Desian. And Value As That Alleaed To Have Been
Stolen: And Further Erred In lnstructina The Jurv That The State Did Not Have
The Burden To Prove. Bevond A Reasonable Doubt. Facts Other Than Those
Specificallv Outlined By The District Court

C.

As an initial matter, it should be noted that Mr. Johnson did not object to the
district court's proposed jury instructions in this case. While ordinarily a party may not
claim error in the court's jury instruction on appeal absent an objection prior to
deliberations, certain claims of instructional error are reviewable for the first time on
appeal under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Anderson, 144 ldaho 743, 748,
170 P.3d 886, 891 (2007); Rolon, 146 ldaho at 693, 201 P.3d at 662. An instructional
error is fundamental if it so profoundly distorts the trial that it produces manifest injustice
and deprives the accused of his fundamental right to due process. Id. "Jury instructions
that fail to require the State to prove every element of the offense violate due process
and, thus, rise to the level of a fundamental error." Rolon, 146 ldaho at 693, 201 P.3d
at 662.

The district court in this case failed to instruct the jury that, before they could
resort to the replacement cost put forth by the State in order to measure the grade of
the offense, the State had to first prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that:

(1) the

market value of the wires alleged to have been stolen could not be satisfactorily
ascertained; and (2) the replacement cost proffered by the State was for property
reasonably close in quality, design, and value as that alleged to have been stolen.
(Tr., p.304, L.8

-

p.315, L.4.)

As previously noted, the State bore the burden of

establishing these facts beyond a reasonable doubt because these facts were
prerequisite findings to any valuation of the property alleged to have been stolen at a
value of over $1,000 - the threshold finding for elevating Mr. Johnson's offense from a
misdemeanor to a felony. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 697703; Point I(C) supra. Because the district court failed to inform the jury that the State
bore the burden of proving these facts beyond a reasonable doubt, the court
affirmatively relieved the State of its constitutional obligation of proof in this case.
This omission was exacerbated by another of the district court's instructions that
informed the jury that, unless told otherwise by the court, the State did not have to prove
any fact beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court provided the jury with a nonpattern instruction that:
The instructions on reasonable doubt and the burden of proof to be carried
by the State of Idaho do nof require fhe State to prove every fact and
every circumstance in evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden
of proof extends only to the material elements of the offense. These
maferial elements are sef forth in the following insfrucfion.
(Tr., p.307, Ls.16-22; R., p.167.) (emphasis added.)

The "following instruction" referred to in the singular was an instruction on the
elements of theft by possession of stolen property. (Tr., p.307, L.23

- p.309,

L.2;

R., p.168.) This instruction did not include the value element that established the grade
of the offense. (Tr., p.307, L.23 - p.309, L.2; R., p.168.) In another instruction, the jury
was informed that the State was required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
value of the property alleged to have been stolen was over $1,000 in value in order to
convict Mr. Johnson of grand theft. (Tr. p.309, Ls.17-22; R., p.170.)

However, as

previously noted, the district court made no such instruction regarding the requirement
that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that market value could not be
satisfactorily ascertained and that the replacement cost put forth by the State bears a
close relationship in quality, design, and value to the property alleged to have been
stolen.
A similar instruction was criticized in the recent ldaho Court of Appeals decision
in State

V.

Rossignol, - Idaho -,

- P.3d -,

2009 WL 1637035 (Ct. App.

2009).' In that case, the district court instructed the jury that it would outline for the jury
the elements of the offense that had to be established beyond a reasonable doubt, and
also contained a similar provision that it was not necessary for the State "to establish
every fact and every circumstance put into evidence beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at

*14. The defendant's challenge to the instruction was limited to the fact that the district
court purported to outline the elements of the offense, but did not immediately do so. Id.
at "13.

The court in Rossignol found that, when read as a whole, the elements

As of the writing of this brief, the opinion in Rossignol has not yet been released for
publication in the permanent law reports and is therefore subject to revision or
withdrawal.

instructions for the two charged offenses were ultimately provided to the jury, and
therefore the court did not find error. Id. at 14. In doing so, however, the Rossignol
Court also criticized the use of this instruction:

... we take this opportunity to reiterate that deviations from the pattern lCJl
"have created unnecessary controversies with nothing added by way of
clarity ... Trial courts are encouraged to avoid unnecessary appeals and
controversy by utilizing the instruction that has an accepted history
defining the burden the State bears."
Id. (internal citation omitted).
Here, the flaw with the instruction employed by the district court creates a
different and much more serious problem -this instruction appears to have affirmatively
informed the jury that the State did not have to prove a fact beyond a reasonable doubt
unless the district court instructed them that this burden existed for that fact. This is an
incorrect statement of the law that affirmatively relieved the State of its burden of
proving facts that were necessary in order for Mr. Johnson to be found guilty of grand
theft, as opposed to the lesser charge of petit theft. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490;
Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 697-703. As such, the district court's jury instructions in this case
amounted to fundamental error because they relieved the State of its constitutional
burden of proof.

D.. The Instructional Error In This Case Was Not Harmless
This Court employs a constitutional harmless error test to cases where the
district court erroneously omits an essential element from the instructions to the jury.
Rolon, 146 ldaho at 693, 201 P.3d at 662. Under this test, an error cannot be deemed
harmless if there is a reasonable possibility that the error complained of might have
contributed to the conviction. Anderson, 144 ldaho at 749, 170 P.3d at 892. Relevant

to this determination is whether the evidence ot the omitted element was controverted at
trial and whether the evidence was overwhelming. Rolon, 146 ldaho at 693, 201 P.3d
at 662. The State bears the burden of showing that the error had no effect on a
defendant's substantial rights. Id. at 694, 201 P.3d at 663.
Here, there was a dearth of any evidence that would support the two findings that
the jury was never told the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover,
the issue of whether there was a market value and the appropriate measure of the
market value was hotly contested throughout the proceedings, as was the issue of
whether the replacement cost proffered by the State was for property that was a
reasonably close approximation of that alleged to have been stolen. This is not a case
where there was overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence that would have supported
the pertinent findings.
Moreover, the ldaho Supreme Court has specifically noted that prejudice flowing
from an omitted element may be exacerbated in light of the other instructions provided
from the district court that minimized the importance of the element. Anderson, 144
ldaho at 748-749, 170 P.3d at 891-892. Here, the district court, in essence, excused
the State from its burden of proof by informing the jury that the State did not have to
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, any fact unless they were told by the district court
that the State bore the burden for that finding or element.

The District Court Erred, And Violated Mr. Johnson's Constitutional Riaht To Present An
Adeauate Defense And To Compulsory Process, When The Court Excluded An
Excul~atoryDefense Witness As A Discovetv Sanction
A.

Introduction
Defense counsel was approached on the morning of the second day of trial by a

potential witness - James Arterburn - that counsel had previously tried, unsuccessfully,
to locate prior to trial. Defense counsel never provided notice to the State pursuant to
I.C.R. 16 of this potential witness. The district court ruled that this witness would be
excluded from trial based solely upon the lateness of the disclosure. However, the
district court never engaged in the required analysis of balancing Mr. Johnson's right to
a fair trial against the potential prejudice to the State, the State alleged no prejudice
flowing from the possible introduction this witness' testimony at trial, and the district
court failed to consider any potential lesser sanctions as a remedy for the discovery
violation.

Because the district court failed to act consistently with applicable legal

standards, the district court abused its discretion when it excluded Mr. Arterburn from
testifying in Mr. Johnson's trial.
Moreover, this error was not harmless because this was a largely circumstantial
case in which Mr. Johnson's credibility was of central importance to his defense. And,
in closing arguments, the prosecutor specifically highlighted and attempted to discredit
those portions of Mr. Johnson's testimony that Mr. Arterburn could have corroborated
with his own testimony.

6.

Standard Of Review
This Court reviews the district court's exclusion of a witness as a sanction for a

discovery violation for an abuse of discretion. Sfafe v. Harris, 132 ldaho 843, 846, 979

P.2d. 1201, 1204 (1999); State v. Lamphere, 130 ldaho 630, 633, 945 P.2d 1, 4 (1997).
Review for an abuse of discretion is a multi-tiered inquiry as to whether: (1) the district
court correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) the district court acted within the
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards; and (3) the
district court reached its decision through an exercise of reason. Harris, 132 ldaho at

C.

The District Court Erred. And Violated Mr. Johnson's Constitutional Riahts To
Present An Adequate Defense And To Compulsory Process, When The District
Court Excluded An Exculpatory Defense Witness As A Discoverv Sanction
Without First Weighing Any Potential Preiudice To The State Aaainst
Mr. Johnson's Riaht To A Fair Trial Or Considering Whether Anv Lesser
Sanctions Would Adequateiv Address The Discovery Violation
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right pursuant to the Compulsory

Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment to offer the testimony of witnesses on his or
her behalf and to present evidence in his or her own defense.'

Harris, 132 ldaho at

846, 979 P.2d at 7204. Indeed, "[flew rights are more fundamental than that of an
accused to present witnesses in his own defense," which is "an essential attribute of the
adversarial system itself."

Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408 (1988).

The

constitutional right to present a complete defense "is abridged by evidence rules that

' The constitutional protections of the right to compulsory process and to present a
meaningful defense, as protected by the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, are
applicable on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Taylor v.
Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409 (1988).

'infring[e] upon a weighty interest of the accused' and are 'arbitrary or disproportionate
to the purposes they are designed to serve.'" Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319,
324 (2006) (quoting U.S. v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998)). However, in some
circumstances, the district court may be permitted to exclude entirely the testimony of a
defense witness as a sanction for a discovery violation. Harris, 132 ldaho at 846, 979
P.2d at 1204.
Under I.C.R. 16(c), upon a written request by the prosecuting attorney, the
defense is required to disclose certain evidence that it intends to rely upon at trial,
including, "a list of names and addresses the defendant intends to call at trial." I.C.R.
16(c). A defendant is required to file and serve a written response to a discovery
request within 14 days. I.C.R. 16(e)(l). This rule also authorizes the district court to
impose sanctions as a result of a party failing to comply with the rule. I.C.R. 16(e)(2).
Where the failure of defense counsel to comply with a valid discovery request
and identify a witness is shown from the record to have been willful and intentional,
complete exclusion of that witness' testimony can be appropriate regardless of other
available sanctions short of excluding the witness. Harris, 132 ldaho at 846, 979 P.2d
at 1204. However, in all other cases, the district court is required to weigh the prejudice
that could be suffered by the State flowing from the late disclosure against the
defendant's right to a fair trial. Id; State v. Albert, 138 ldaho 284, 288, 62 P.3d 208, 212
(Ct. App. 2002). Moreover, mere absence of good cause for the failure to timely provide
notice of the witness "is not necessarily commensurate with 'willful' conduct." Albeit
138 ldaho at 288 n.2, 62 P.3d at 212 (quoting Escalera v. Coombe, 852 F.2d 45,48 (2d
Cir. 1988)).

--

The ldaho Supreme Court decision in State v. Harris is particularly instructive for
this Court. In Harris, defense counsel apparently neglected to provide any notice to the
State of a potential defense witness at all prior to attempting to call the witness at trial.
Harris, 132 ldaho at 845, 979 P.2d at 1204. The State objected to the calling of this
witness due to the lack of notice, and asked that this witness be excluded from testifying
at trial.

Id.

The district court then excluded the witness from testifying, despite

acknowledging that defense counsel's failure to disclose the witness in a timely fashion
was inadvertent. Id.
The Court in Harris determined that this was an abuse of discretion because, "the
trial court did not weigh any prejudice that might be suffered by the State against Harris'
right to a fair trial." Id. at 847, 979 P.2d at 1205. There, as in this case, the district court
improperly relied solely on the lateness of the disclosure of the witness where there was
no indication from the State as to how this late disclosure created any prejudice to the
State's case. (Tr., p.253, L.'I1 - p.256, L. 17.)
Additionally, in Lamphere, the ldaho Supreme Court explicitly noted the fact that
the State failed to allege any prejudice on the basis of the late disclosure of the witness,
but rather simply objected based on the lateness of the disclosure, when the Court
determined that the district court abused its discretion when it excluded a defense
witness as a discovery violation. Lamphere, 130 ldaho at 633-634, 945 P.2d at 4-5.
This mirrors the nature of the State's objection in this case, which was limited to the
timing of defense counsel's disclosure of the witness at the close of the State's
evidence, and contains no assertion of whether or how the State would suffer any
prejudice as a result of the untimely disclosure. (Tr., p.253, Ls.11-20.)

Moreover, in a serious felony case, "it is ordinarily the trial court's obligation 'to
fashion a sanction which will impress counsel with the importance of responding to
discovery requests, and yet will not prejudice the defense of the case."13 Albert, 138
ldaho at 287, 62 P.3d at 211. The district court should also consider whether the
discovery violation is attributable to defense counsel, rather than the defendant
personally, prior to imposing the extreme remedy of complete exclusion of a witness
from testifying at trial. State v. Winson, 129 ldaho 298, 303, 923 P.2d 1005, 1010
(Ct. App. 1996). While grand theft is normally not the most serious of felony offenses
under ldaho law, it is important to remember that Mr. Johnson was also charged with
being a persistent violator; and that, therefore, his conviction exposed him to upwards of
a life sentence.

(R., pp.48-50.)

Because of the seriousness of the charges that

Mr. Johnson was facing in this case, the district court was required to consider the
adequacy of lesser sanctions prior to excluding completely Mr. Arterburn's testimony.
The district court in this case failed entirely to balance the potential prejudice to
the State - or inquire as to whether there would be any prejudice to the State - based
upon the late disclosure of Mr. Arterburn as a potential witness against Mr. Johnson's
constitutional rights to a fair trial and to present a defense. Instead, the district court
relied entirely on the lateness of this disclosure as the basis for excluding
Mr. Arterburn's testimony. (Tr., p.255, L.12

- p.256,

L.17.) The court also failed to

consider whether there were any lesser sanctions that would be appropriate to address
Common alternative sanctions are granting a short continuance so as to allow the
State to interview the witness, declaring a mistrial, or imposing a fine against defense
counsel. See, e.g., A/ber& 138 Idaho at 289, 62 P.3d at 213; State v. Thomas, 133
ldaho 800,803,992 P.2d 795,798 (Ct. App. 1999).

the discovery violation that were short of completely excluding the witness. In sum, the
district court failed to follow clearly applicable legal standards in its determination to
completely preclude Mr. Johnson from presenting the testimony of Mr. Aterburn in
support of his defense.
D.

The District Court's Error in Excludinq Entirely The Testimony Of The Late
Disclosed Witness Was Not Harmless
Where error concerns evidence improperly excluded at trial, "the test is whether

there is a reasonable probability that the lack of the excluded evidence might have
contributed to the conviction." Harris, 132 Idaho at 847, 979 P.2d at 1205. Relevant to
consideration of this issue is whether the testimony that was excluded would have
supported the account of events provided by the defendant in cases where credibility is
of central concern. Id. at 847-848, 979 P.2d at 1205-1206.
In this case, Mr. Johnson's defense was, in large measure, comprised of his
version of events that was provided through his testimony of the circumstances
surrounding his sale of copper wire.

As such, his credibility was of paramount

importance in this case. Mr. Arterburn was a disinterested witness who could have
supported Mr. Johnson's version of events, and therefore his credibility. In particular,
Mr. Arterburn would have testified that: (1) he personally observed the two rolls of wire
behind Mr. Johnson's brother's house that Mr. Johnson testified was the source of the
wire he had sold on two occasions; and (2) that the reason that Randy Aterburn's name
appeared on one of the sales receipts was that Mr. Arterburn and Randy Arterburn gave
Mr. Johnson their permission to use their account at Pacific Steel and Recycling to sell
the copper wire. (Tr., p.241, Ls.4-9; p.254, Ls.10-23.) Defense counsel also specifically

noted the importance of this testimony as it related to the degree to which the jury might
give credence to Mr. Johnson's version of events. (Tr., p.254, Ls.10-17.)
Beyond the inherent importance of Mr. Arterburn's testimony, the absence of this
testimony becomes of even greater significance given the prosecutor's closing remarks
in this case.

The prosecutor took advantage of the district court's exclusion of

Mr. Arterburn's testimony by casting doubt on exactly those facts provided in
Mr. Johnson's testimony that Mr. Arterburn could have corroborated.

Notably, the

prosecutor said the following:
[Mr. Johnson] also said that he was bringing [the wire] in on his own, but
on the 2znd when he brought that wire in from the railroad he had
someone, a Jason or I can't remember his name, but a brother of Randy
Arterburn whose name appears on the receipt from the 22ndon the top
left-hand corner. What's that all about? Well, you can conclude that (A),
he just happened to pick his friend up who took him to Pacific Steel and
Recycling and said, hey, put that on our account, that's okay you can say
we told you that you could sell that property for us.

So why would Lonnie Johnson happen to run over some railroad wire near
the tracks and then take it in with his friend and then say he was selling it
for his friend's brother? How does that make any sense? Maybe because
he was frying to cover something up and make it look like it wasn't actually
stolen property.
(Tr., p.322, L.3-p.323, L.6.)
Obviously, the jury in this case never heard anything at all from Mr. Arterburn, or
even knew for certain that Mr. Arterburn really existed. Because the district court
prevented Mr. Johnson from calling Mr. Arterburn as a witness, this provided an
opportunity for the prosecutor in this case to imply that the presence of Mr. Arterburn's
name on one of the receipts was somehow evidence of an attempt on Mr. Johnson's

part to deceive the recycling center as to the source of the copper, rather than being
merely an expediency for purposes of processing the copper sale.
In addition, the prosecutor also attempted to cast doubt on Mr. Johnson's claim
that he had found and sold copper wire present on his brother's property during the
State's closing remarks. (Tr., p.323, L.14 - p.324, L.6.) Mr. Arterburn would have been
able to testify, in corroboration of Mr. Johnson's testimony, that he had personally
observed the rolls of copper wire on Mr. Johnson's brother's property. (Tr., p.241, Ls.49; p.254, Ls.10-23.) In a case where credibility was the sum and substance of the

defense, exclusion of Mr. Arterburn's testimony as corroboration of the defense version
of events cannot be said to have been harmless.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct Rising To The Level Of A Fundamental Error
When She Referred To Mr. Johnson As A "Scavenaer" And A "Buzzard;" And When
She Mischaracterized The Substance Of Mr. Johnson's Testimonv During Closinq
Arquments
A.

Introduction
Mr. Johnson asserts that the prosecutor in this case committed prosecutorial

misconduct, rising to the level of a fundamental error, when the prosecutor attempted to
evoke the sympathies of the jury towards the railroad company, called Mr. Johnson
names, and misstated the record of Mr. Johnson's testimony in this case.

B.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct Risina To The Level Of A Fundamental
Error When She Referred To Mr. Johnson As A "Scavenner" And A "Buzzard:"
f
During Closinn Arguments
As an initial matter, Mr. Johnson did not object to the prosecutor's remarks at

issue in this case. "When there is no contemporaneous objection, a conviction will be
reversed for prosecutorial misconduct only if the conduct is sufficiently egregious so as
to result in fundamental error." Sfafe v. Gross, 146 ldaho 15, 18, 189 P.3d 477, 480
(Ct. App. 2008). Prosecutorial misconduct rises to the level of a fundamental error
when it is calculated to inflame the passions and prejudice of the jury against the
defendant or is otherwise so inflammatory as to create the potential that the jury may be
influenced to determine guilt on factors outside of the evidence. Id; Sfafe v. Kuhn, 139
ldaho 710, 715, 85 P.3d 1109, 1114 (Ct. App. 2003). However, in order to be deemed
fundamental, the prosecutor's remarks, taken in the context of the entire closing
argument, must be so egregious or inflammatory that a curative instruction to the jury
would not have cured the prejudice. Kuhn, 139 ldaho at 715, 85 P.3d at 1114.
Here, there were two separate instances of prosecutorial misconduct, both of
which rose to the level of a fundamental error.

First, the prosecutor in this case

attempted to engage the passion and prejudice of the jury, rather than arguing proper
inferences from the evidence, when she attempted to engender the sympathy of the jury
by portraying the railroad as a particularly vulnerable victim while simultaneously
denigrating the defendant personally by calling him names. Second, the prosecutor
misstated Mr. Johnson's testimony, and, in so doing, erroneously argued that he had
admitted knowing the wire was stolen and was the railroad's property.

While both parties are generally given considerable latitude in closing arguments,
it is improper for a prosecutor to employ inflammatory words when describing the
defendant during closing arguments. State v. Severson, -Idaho

,

P.3d -,

2009 WL 1492659, *22 (2009).~ In particular, prosecutors as quasi-judicial officers
"have a duty to ensure that defendants receive fair trials." Id. at *17.
"Appeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury through use of inflammatory
tactics are impermissible." Gross, 146 ldaho at 20, 189 P.3d at 482. In this case, the
prosecutor indisputably made such an appeal during closing arguments when she used
derogatory language to describe the defendant and further attempted to engender and
play on the jury's sympathies towards the railroad company as a "long celebrated
industry" that is vulnerable because it is "in decline." (Tr., p.330, L.25

- p.331, L.8.)

During closing argument, the prosecutor made the following remarks:
On a new note, ladies and gentlemen, the railroad is a long celebrated
industry, but it is definitely in decline. There is a lot of competition out
there these days. There is [sic] semis, boats, planes, and most of all
technology, but that doesn't make it okay for thieves to be targeting
railroad property. Railroad lines are not for scavengers, and that is what
the defendant is. He is a scavenger. He is a buzzard. He is picking off
the bones of the railroad industry.
(Tr., p.330, p.25-p.331, L.8.)
The prosecutor in this case referred to Mr. Johnson personally as a predatory
animal and further denigrated him by calling him a "scavenger."

While attorneys

commonly make use of analogies in order to help the jury understand the law or the
arguments of the parties, there is clearly a limitation on the use of analogy or metaphor

As of the date of the writing of this brief, the opinion in Severson has not yet been
released for publication in the permanent law reports and is subject to revision or
withdrawal.

where such tactics overstep the bounds of permissible argument. The ldaho Supreme
Court has recognized as much when the Court held that it is clearly improper for a
prosecutor to refer to the defendant as a "murdering dog," and further condemned those
statements.

Sfate

v. Hairston, 133 ldaho 496, 507, 988 P.2d 1170, 1182 (1999).

Similarly, ldaho courts have recognized that any argument that consists of calling the
defendant names is improper. See, e.g., Kuhn, 139 ldaho at 716, 85 P.3d at 1115.
In addition, prosecutor's remarks that are designed entirely to evoke sympathy
for the victim, rather than discuss pertinent evidence regarding the issues at trial, are
also improper. See, e.g., State v. Beebe, 145 ldaho 570, 575-576, 181 P.3d 496, 501502 (Ct. App. 2007). Here, the prosecutor's remarks about the celebrated nature of the
railroad industry, and its current vulnerability due to its state of industrial decline, were in
no way based on any evidence that was admitted at trial, nor are they relevant to the
legal issues. The only purpose for such argument is to arouse and evoke the jury's
sympathies. In context with the remarks calling Mr. Johnson a scavenging predator,
these remarks were so inflammatory as to rise to the level of a fundamental error.
The prosecutor in this case also misstated Mr. Johnson's testimony.

The

prosecutor asserted that Mr. Johnson had made admissions with regard to the wire at
issue in this case that he "knew it was probably stolen," and further indicated that
Mr. Johnson and an employee of the railroad, "both I.D. the third batch [of wire] that
came in as Union Pacific Railroad wire." (Tr., p.318, Ls.16-18, p.324, Ls.15-18.) In
actuality, the admissions made by Mr. Johnson to Officer Milovanovic had to do with
wire that was the subject of a different charge out of Lincoln County, and the substance
of his admission was markedly different than was represented by the prosecutor in

I

closing arguments. (Tr., p.158, L. I- p. 162, L.15.) Mr. Johnson merely told the officer
that he knew it was wrong for him to have picked up the wire prior to being arrested,
which was an ambiguous statement at best and certainly not an admission that he had
specific knowledge that the wire was stolen. (Tr., p.162, Ls.9-15.)

More important,

however, is that Mr. Johnson was speaking of wire that was found in his possession
after he had sold the wire at issue in the instant case; and so he had never made any
admissions at all about the wire he had previously sold which formed the basis of his
criminal charges. (Tr., p.159, L.18 - p.160, L.1.)
Mr. Johnson also testified specifically that there was nothing that indicated to him
that any of wire that was related to his charges at trial belonged to anybody, including
the railroad. (Tr., p.299, L.23 - p.300, L.7.) "It is plainly improper for a party to present
closing argument that misrepresents or mischaracterizes the evidence." Beebe, 145
ldaho at 575, 181 P.3d at 501. Because knowledge that the wire was stolen was an
element of the charged offense, this misstatement of the evidence by the prosecutor
created the false impression that the State had direct evidence in the form of a
confession as to the element of Mr. Johnson's purported knowledge that the wire was
stolen. See, e.g., State V. Jones, 125 ldaho 477, 489, 873 P.2d 122, 134 (1994) (direct
evidence includes confessions of the defendant).
Moreover, the prosecutor's acts of misconduct during closing arguments were
not harmless. Even where prosecutorial misconduct rises to the level of a fundamental
error, "the conviction will not be reversed when that error is harmless." Severson, 2009
VVL 1492659, "17. A prosecutor's remarks may be deemed harmless if the State
presents such overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt such that that the

likelihood that the remarks contributed to the verdict is minimal. Hairsfon, I33 Idaho at

In this case, the State's evidence was circumstantial, and cannot be said to have
been so overwhelming that there is not a likelihood that the prosecutor's improper
remarks contributed to the verdict. The Washington Court of Appeals case of State v.
Rivers is instructive on this point. Sfafe v. Rivers, 981 P.2d 16, 17-19 (Wash. Ct. App.
1999). The prosecutor in Rivers, as did the prosecutor in this case, played on the
sympathy of the jury by first casting the victim as helpless due to his state of
intoxication.
"predators

Id. at 17. The prosecutor then cast Mr. Rivers and his cohorts as

.. they are nothing more than hyenas." Id. At a later point in closing

argument, the prosecutor against likened the defendant to another predatory animal,
calling him a "jackal." Id. The Rivers Court determined that these remarks were an
improper appeal to the passions and prejudice of the jury. Id. at 18.
In reviewing whether this error was harmless, the Rivers Court determined that it
was not. Specifically, the court held that:
The defendant's case hinged on his and his witness' credibility. The
prosecutor attacked his credibility in an inappropriate manner, instead of
adhering to his responsibility to utilize appropriate evidence that relates to
the elements of the crime to persuade the jury that the State has met its
burden of proof. Instead of focusing the jury's attention properly to the
elements of the crime and the State's burden of proof, the prosecutor
resorted to ill-conceived rhetoric aimed squarely at the jury's passions.
We do not know whether the State would have succeeded without this
inappropriate argument. We do know that this highly inappropriate
conduct undermined the integrity of the criminal justice process to such an
extent that justice was not done below.

Here, as in Rivers, Mr. Johnson's defense rested in large measure squarely on
the shoulders of his credibility. The State's case was circumstantial, which made the
credibility contest in this case even more central to the jury's verdict.

In making

improper arguments that impugned Mr. Johnson's character, and in misstating the
substance of Mr. Johnson's testimony, the prosecutor resorted to improper and
inflammatory tactics in order to induce the jury to reach a verdict outside of the proper
bounds of the evidence in this case.

The State also implied that there was an

admission on the part of Mr. Johnson as to a critical element of the offense when, in
fact, there was none. As such, the prosecutor's misconduct cannot be said to have
been harmless.

v.
The District Court Erred When The Court Awarded Restitution In The Amount Of $2,000
A.

Introduction
The district court erred when it awarded restitution in the amount of $2,000.

B.

Standard Of Review
The decision as to whether to order restitution, and what amount of restitution to

order, is within the district court's discretion. Smith, 144 Idaho at 692, 169 P.3d at 280.
"When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine:

(1) whether the lower court correctly

perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to

the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an
exercise of reason." Id.
C.

The District Court Erred When The Court Awarded Restitution In The Amount Of
$2.000
"Restitution may only be awarded for actual economic loss suffered by the

victim." Smith, 144 ldaho at 692, 169 P.3d at 280 (citing I.C.

$3 19-5304(1)(a),

(2)).

Valuation of property for purposes of restitution, as with valuation of property for
purposes of determining the gradation of a theft offense, is determined according to the
fair market value of the property as opposed to the cost of replacement. Id.
As previously noted, the fair market value of the wires alleged to have been
stolen was measured by the price that was paid by Pacific Steel and Recycling

-

$665.05. See Point I (C) supra. (See also Tr., p.242, Ls.3-4.) Because the district court
awarded restitution in excess of the fair market value of the wire, the district court failed
to follow the applicable legal standards attendant on its determination of restitution and
thereby abused its discretion.
VI.
Proper Application Of The Cumulative Error Doctrine Reauires Reversal In This Case
Finally, Mr. Johnson asserts that, even if the errors in this case are not deemed
reversible when taken individually, in the aggregate, the errors in this case rose to the
level of denying Mr. Johnson a fair trial. The doctrine of cumulative error requires the
reversal of a conviction when there is, "an accumulation of irregularities, each of which
by itself might be harmless, but when aggregated, the errors show an absence of a fair
trial, in contravention of the defendant's right to due process." State v. Field, 144 ldaho

559, 572-573, 165 P.3d 273, 286-287 (2007). Given the number of errors occurring in
this case, the cumulative effect of these errors operated to deprive Mr. Johnson of his
right to a fair trial. As such, proper application of the cumulative error doctrine requires
reversal in this case.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Johnson respectfully requests that this Court reverse his judgment of
conviction and sentence and remand his case for entry of a judgment of conviction and
sentence for misdemeanor theft. In the alternative, he requests that this Court reverse
his judgment of conviction and sentence and remand his case for further proceedings.
In the alternative, Mr. Johnson respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district
court's order of restitution and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 2gthday of June, 2009.
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